How Mali’s democratic promise collapsed into years of coups, rebellion and insecurity

Mali’s latest wave of coordinated attacks has again exposed how fragile the country’s security situation has become. Armed groups struck several locations across the country, including areas near Bamako, the capital’s airport, and northern and central cities such as Kidal, Mopti, Sevare and Gao. The attacks were claimed by al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, known as JNIM, while Tuareg rebels also said they took part.

The killing of Defence Minister Sadio Camara has deepened the shock. For Mali’s military government, which has repeatedly promised to restore security, the attacks are a serious blow.

But Mali’s crisis did not begin this week. It is the result of decades of political instability, weak institutions, northern rebellions, military coups and shifting foreign alliances.

From independence to authoritarian rule

Mali became independent from France on September 22, 1960. Modibo Keita became the country’s first president and tried to build the new state around African socialism.

His government pursued nationalisation and state-led economic policies, but these failed to deliver the prosperity many had expected. Droughts and poor harvests worsened the country’s economic situation, creating frustration and instability.

In 1968, Keita was overthrown in a military coup led by Lieutenant Moussa Traore.

Traore then ruled Mali for more than two decades. His government became known for repression, corruption and weak economic performance. Protesters and political opponents were often treated brutally, and dissent was heavily restricted.

By 1991, public anger had reached a breaking point. Student-led protests spread, and Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Toure removed Traore from power in another coup.

That moment opened the door to Mali’s democratic period.

The democratic years — and their hidden weaknesses

After Traore’s fall, Mali began a transition toward multiparty politics. A new constitution was introduced, elections were organised, and Alpha Oumar Konare became president in 1992.

For many observers, Mali became a hopeful example in West Africa. It held elections, allowed political competition and developed a reputation for civil liberties. Konare served two terms, and the country was seen as one of the region’s more stable democracies.

But the problems underneath never disappeared.

Northern Mali remained unstable. Tuareg groups continued to demand greater autonomy or independence for a region they call Azawad. State control in the north was weak, and many communities felt ignored by Bamako.

In 2002, Amadou Toumani Toure returned to power through elections. Although he had helped lead the 1991 transition, his presidency later became associated with corruption, weak governance and a declining economy.

By the early 2010s, Mali’s democratic image was becoming increasingly fragile.

2012: The year Mali’s crisis exploded

The turning point came in 2012.

Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo led a coup shortly before planned elections and forced President Toure to resign. The military claimed the government had failed to deal with the growing rebellion in the north.

But instead of stabilising the country, the coup made the situation worse.

Tuareg separatists, joined at first by armed groups linked to al-Qaeda, launched a rebellion and took control of large parts of northern Mali. Soon after, groups such as Ansar Dine pushed aside the Tuareg rebels and seized major northern cities.

The state was losing control fast.

Neighbouring West African countries pushed for a regional military response, but Sanogo resisted foreign troop deployments and asked mainly for logistical help.

In 2013, France intervened militarily at the request of Mali’s government. French forces helped push armed groups back from key cities, but the intervention did not solve the deeper crisis.

The armed groups adapted, regrouped and expanded over time.

A fragile return to civilian rule

Elections were held later in 2013, and Ibrahim Boubacar Keita became president.

His government inherited a country already damaged by rebellion, military interference and foreign intervention. In 2015, a UN-backed peace deal was reached between the government and northern Tuareg groups.

The deal was meant to reduce the conflict in the north and give armed factions a political path forward.

But implementation was weak, trust remained low, and insecurity continued to spread. Armed groups did not disappear. Instead, violence moved deeper into central Mali and became increasingly complex.

Groups linked to al-Qaeda grew stronger. Local grievances, ethnic tensions, state abuses and weak governance created space for fighters to recruit and operate.

By the end of Keita’s presidency, many Malians were frustrated. They saw a government unable to stop violence, fix corruption or improve living conditions.

2020: The military returns

In August 2020, Colonel Assimi Goita and other officers removed Keita from power after months of protests.

The coup was presented by its supporters as a reset — a chance to clean up politics, restore order and confront armed groups more effectively.

A transitional government was formed, with retired colonel Bah Ndaw as interim president and Goita as vice president.

But the transition did not last.

In May 2021, Goita carried out a second coup and took full control. Mali was now firmly under military rule again.

The junta promised to return the country to civilian government, initially setting a target of March 2024. That promise was not kept.

The Russia shift and the French exit

One of the biggest changes under Goita was Mali’s break with France.

French forces had been active in Mali for years, but relations between Bamako and Paris deteriorated sharply. The military government accused France of failing to deliver security, while France and its partners criticised the junta’s political direction.

Mali then turned toward Russia.

In late 2021, Goita’s government brought in Russian mercenaries to support military operations against armed groups. French and other European forces eventually withdrew, leaving a major shift in Mali’s security architecture.

The junta argued that new partners would help restore control. But the security situation continued to deteriorate.

Northern rebels, al-Qaeda-linked fighters and other armed actors kept operating. In some areas, violence intensified.

The collapse of old regional ties

Mali’s foreign policy also moved away from its traditional regional partners.

In January 2025, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger withdrew from ECOWAS, the West African regional bloc. The three military-led states instead built their own alliance, the Alliance of Sahel States.

For Bamako, the move was framed as a step toward sovereignty and independence from outside pressure.

But it also deepened Mali’s isolation from many of its former partners.

At the same time, the government ended the 2015 peace agreement with Tuareg rebels, accusing them of failing to respect the deal. That decision removed one of the last political frameworks for managing the northern conflict.

The result was more confrontation.

Why the latest attacks matter

The most worrying development now is the apparent coordination between groups that do not share the same long-term goals.

Tuareg rebels seek autonomy or independence for the north. JNIM has a different ideological agenda and is linked to al-Qaeda. But both see Mali’s military government as a common enemy.

That overlap has created a dangerous battlefield reality.

In 2024, armed fighters ambushed a convoy carrying Malian soldiers and Russian personnel near Tinzaouaten in northeastern Mali. Now, coordinated attacks have reached sensitive areas near Bamako and other strategic locations.

This sends a clear message: the armed groups are no longer only a distant northern problem. They can threaten the state’s image of control much closer to the centre of power.

For Goita’s government, this is especially damaging. The junta’s legitimacy rests heavily on the claim that military rule can deliver security better than civilian politicians did.

Every major attack weakens that claim.

The deeper problem

Mali’s crisis is not just about terrorism. It is about the failure of the state to build lasting trust, especially outside the capital.

For decades, northern communities have accused Bamako of neglect. Military governments have promised order but often produced more repression. Civilian governments promised democracy but struggled with corruption and weak institutions.

Foreign interventions helped stop immediate collapses, but they did not create lasting stability.

Now Mali faces several crises at once: armed rebellion, jihadist expansion, military rule, regional isolation, economic pressure and declining trust in the state.

The country that was once praised as a democratic model in West Africa has become one of the clearest examples of how quickly weak institutions can unravel when security, politics and governance all fail together.

Mali’s uncertain future

The latest attacks show that Mali’s military government is far from fully in control.

Despite promises of sovereignty and security, the country remains vulnerable. Armed groups are adapting, alliances are shifting, and the conflict is spreading in ways that are harder to contain.

Mali’s democratic period once made it a symbol of political progress in the region.

Today, its story is very different.

It is a story of coups replacing elections, military promises replacing democratic accountability, and insecurity spreading despite years of foreign intervention and domestic crackdowns.

The central question now is not only whether Mali’s army can defeat armed groups.

It is whether the Malian state can rebuild enough legitimacy to hold the country together.