Turkey Wants Back Into the F-35 Program — And Washington May Be Ready to Listen

Turkey Wants Back Into the F-35 Program — And Washington May Be Ready to Listen

Türkiye’s long-running dispute with the United States over the F-35 fighter jet may be entering a new phase.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has said he hopes Washington will agree to sell Türkiye F-35 stealth fighters, reopening a defence relationship that was severely damaged after Ankara purchased Russia’s S-400 air-defence system.

The issue is now back at the centre of NATO politics.

U.S. President Donald Trump said the United States plans to lift sanctions against Türkiye and will decide whether to move forward on a possible F-35 sale. The comments signal one of the strongest indications yet that Washington may be willing to repair a major break with one of NATO’s most important military powers.

But a decision is far from guaranteed.

Türkiye was removed from the F-35 program in 2019 after it acquired the Russian-made S-400 missile-defence system. U.S. officials argued that operating the S-400 alongside the F-35 could expose sensitive information about the aircraft to Russia.

The dispute was not only about a fighter jet.

It was about trust.

It raised questions over whether a NATO member could operate advanced U.S. military technology while also maintaining a major Russian defence system. It also revealed how difficult it can be for the alliance to manage internal disagreements at a time of growing pressure from Russia, instability in the Middle East and rising competition between major powers.

For Türkiye, the F-35 issue has become a matter of military capability, national prestige and political independence.

For the United States, it has become a test of whether strategic alliances can survive when security concerns collide with geopolitical reality.

The F-35 is one of the most advanced fighter aircraft in the world. It combines stealth technology, advanced sensors, electronic warfare capabilities and data-sharing systems designed to give pilots and allied forces a clearer picture of the battlefield.

Türkiye was not originally only a customer.

It was a partner in the program.

Turkish companies produced components for the aircraft, while Ankara planned to buy dozens of F-35s for its air force. Türkiye had already invested heavily in the program before Washington removed it.

The relationship changed after Türkiye decided to purchase the Russian S-400 system.

The S-400 is a powerful air-defence platform designed to detect and track aircraft, including advanced Western military systems. U.S. officials feared that if Türkiye operated both the S-400 and the F-35, Russia could gain indirect insight into the jet’s radar signature, flight patterns or operational characteristics.

Türkiye rejected that argument.

Ankara insisted that it needed the S-400 because it had been unable to secure a satisfactory Western air-defence alternative at the time. Turkish officials also argued that the system would not be integrated into NATO networks in a way that threatened allied security.

Washington was not convinced.

The United States suspended Türkiye from the F-35 program and imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, known as CAATSA. The sanctions targeted Türkiye’s defence procurement agency and key officials.

The result was one of the most serious disputes between the two NATO allies in decades.

Türkiye remained inside NATO, continued cooperating with the alliance on regional security and kept one of the largest armed forces in the organisation.

But its access to one of NATO’s most important next-generation military platforms was cut off.

Now, that relationship may be changing.

Trump’s remarks suggest that the White House sees value in repairing ties with Ankara. The move comes as Türkiye is playing an increasingly important role in NATO strategy, Black Sea security, the Middle East and the alliance’s wider relationship with Russia.

Türkiye controls access to the Bosporus and Dardanelles, two strategically vital waterways linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. It has a major domestic defence industry, a large military and strong influence across the Balkans, the Caucasus, Syria, Iraq and the eastern Mediterranean.

For Washington, a closer relationship with Ankara offers clear strategic advantages.

For Erdoğan, a return to the F-35 program would be a major political win.

It would allow him to present Türkiye as a country that cannot be ignored by either Washington or Moscow. It would also reinforce his argument that Türkiye should not be forced to choose entirely between the West and other major powers.

That balancing strategy has defined much of Erdoğan’s foreign policy.

Türkiye is a NATO member, but it has maintained dialogue with Russia.

It supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but it has also sought to preserve trade and diplomatic ties with Moscow.

It cooperates with Western governments on defence and migration, but it frequently criticises European and U.S. policies.

It has developed its own defence industry while continuing to seek access to advanced Western systems.

The F-35 dispute sits directly inside that balancing act.

A successful agreement with Washington could strengthen Türkiye’s position inside NATO and improve relations with the United States.

But the S-400 issue remains the central obstacle.

U.S. law currently places restrictions on Türkiye’s return to the F-35 program as long as the Russian system remains under Turkish control. Reuters reported that discussions have included possible ways to resolve that problem, including the transfer of the S-400 to a third country.

That would be politically difficult.

Türkiye paid for the system, defended its purchase for years and has repeatedly resisted pressure to abandon it. Giving it up could look like a concession to Washington.

At the same time, keeping it may block Ankara from receiving aircraft it sees as essential for modernising its air force.

This is why the negotiations are likely to be complicated.

The issue is not simply whether the United States wants to sell Türkiye fighter jets.

It is whether both governments can create a security arrangement that Congress, NATO allies and Türkiye’s own political leadership can accept.

Congress may be one of the biggest obstacles.

Even if the White House supports a sale, lawmakers can object. Some members of Congress have long opposed F-35 transfers to Türkiye because of the S-400 dispute, concerns over Türkiye’s regional policy and tensions involving Greece, Cyprus and Israel.

Israeli officials have also expressed concerns about a possible sale, according to Reuters reporting. Israel has long sought to preserve its qualitative military edge in the region, meaning its ability to maintain superior military capabilities compared with potential adversaries.

A return of Türkiye to the F-35 program would therefore have consequences beyond Ankara and Washington.

It could affect the military balance in the eastern Mediterranean.

It could influence relations between Türkiye and Greece.

It could reshape debates inside NATO over who receives access to the alliance’s most advanced technology.

And it could send a signal about whether allies that purchase Russian military systems can later restore full defence cooperation with the United States.

Supporters of a deal would argue that Türkiye is too important to isolate.

They would point out that Türkiye remains a major NATO military power and sits in one of the world’s most strategically important regions. They may argue that keeping Ankara close to Western defence systems is better than pushing it toward deeper dependence on Russia or alternative suppliers.

They may also argue that a carefully structured deal could resolve the S-400 issue while restoring trust.

Critics would respond that restoring access too easily could weaken the message Washington sent in 2019.

If Türkiye can keep or quietly retain Russian systems while regaining access to the F-35, other allies may conclude that U.S. restrictions can eventually be negotiated away.

That could make it harder for Washington to enforce security rules around sensitive military technology.

The debate also comes at a time when Türkiye is pursuing alternatives.

The country has been developing its own KAAN fighter jet and has expanded domestic production of drones, missiles, naval systems and military electronics. Türkiye has also moved forward with deals involving Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft.

That means Ankara is not entirely dependent on the F-35.

But the F-35 remains different.

It is not only an aircraft. It is part of a wider network of data-sharing, allied operations and advanced military interoperability. A country operating the F-35 can connect more closely with other NATO air forces that use the platform.

For Türkiye, access would help modernise its air force and strengthen its role inside the alliance.

For NATO, the decision will reveal how much trust still exists between Ankara and Washington.

The next steps are likely to focus on sanctions, legal restrictions and the fate of the S-400 system.

Trump’s statement that sanctions will be lifted is significant. But it does not automatically mean an F-35 agreement will follow.

The White House must still assess whether Türkiye meets legal requirements. Congress may still challenge a sale. Regional allies may still object. And Ankara must decide whether it is prepared to make concessions on the S-400.

The outcome may become one of the most important defence-policy decisions involving NATO this year.

If Türkiye returns to the F-35 program, it could mark a major reset in U.S.-Turkish relations.

If negotiations fail, it may confirm that the dispute over the S-400 created a break that cannot easily be repaired.

For now, Erdoğan has made Türkiye’s position clear.

He wants the F-35.

Trump has indicated that Washington is willing to talk.

But the real question remains unresolved:

Can a NATO ally operate one of America’s most advanced fighter jets while still holding on to a Russian missile-defence system?

That answer will shape far more than one arms deal.